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ABSTRACT 
It is shown that priors obtained by making coherent choices 
over lotteries are arbitrary, since they depend on the order in which 
the choices are made. 
A COMMENT ON THE SUBJECTIVIST POSITION 
Asad Zaman 
An extremist Bayesian viewpoint, one which I have held in 
the past, maintains that in order to be able to make decision in a 
"reasonable" way, it is necessary to have a prior over all subsets 
of the space of states of nature. I shall show that this is not the 
case by giving a procedure which a frequentist may use to make 
"reasonable" decisions in presence of uncertainty. First I shall 
describe the Bayesian argument, 
Let Q be the space of states of nature, and 
LB = {f : Q + R, sup f(w) < oo}. LB is a 
Banach space with norm 
w 
llfll = sup f(w). * Let L B be the set of continuous linear functionals 
w 
over LB; this is identified with the set of finitely additive measures 
on Q (equipped with the a-field of all subsets). Every element 
µ E L; induces a (complete) ordering of LB via the definition � µ g 
(f is µ-preferred to g) if µ(f) � µ(g) .  For any partial order > on LB, 
define equivalence classes n(f) {g E LB I f > g and g > f}. For 
the preference > we must have n(O) is closed and n(f) = f + n(O) for µ 
all f E LB. Furthermore, n(O) must be of codimension l; n(O) = Ker(v) 
if and only if v = aµ for some a. What may be termed the Fundamental 
Theorem of Subjective Probability is the converse of this result. 
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The Fundamental Theorem of Subjective Probability: Suppose a partial 
order > on LB can be extended to a complete order on some closed 
subspace S of LB, containing the constant functions, and the equivalence 
classes n(s) of the extension satisfy the conditions 
(i) n(O) is closed in S (and therefore in LB), 
(ii) for any f E S, n(f) = f + n(O) 
(iii) n(O) is a subspace of co-dimension 1 in S. 
Furthermore, 
(iv) Nonnegative functions are preferred to 0. 
* 
Then there exists a measure µ E LB such that � coincides 
with the extension of > on S. 
Proof: This follows easily from Theorem 1.41, p. 29 Rudin [1973], 
according to which the quotient map TI : S + S/n(O) is linear and 
continuous (by (i) and (ii)). Since n(O) is of codimension 1, there 
exists a continuous linear bijection i S/n(O) + R. i on is 
then a continuous linear functional on S and it is easy to check that 
it induces the same order on S as > .  ion must be a positive linear 
funtional by (iv). Since S contains at least one constant positive 
* 
function, ion can be extended to a positive linear functional µ E LB, 
by Proposition 6, Chapter II §3 �o. 4, Bourbaki [1953]. Clearly the 
preference induced by µ is the same as that induced by aµ for any 
a > 0 so we can take µ to be of mass 1 without loss of generality. 
It is easy to check that if S is the set of all functions 
measurable with respect to some a-field, S is closed and contains a 
• 
constant function. In Savage' s [1954] treatment of this theorem, 
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S is taken to be LB. Assumption (ii) is referred to as the sure­
thing principle. Assumption (i) and (iii) follow from an assumption 
about continuity of the ordering, which can be stated as follows: 
if g <h and gt n(h), there exist open neighborhoods Nh of h and 
N of g such that x EN y E Nh imply x < y, and x t n(y). Similarly, g g 
other systems of axiomatization must be equivalent to the one given 
above, or stronger, since the conditions above are necessary and 
sufficient. 
The assumption of the theorem above are said to describe 
"coherent" behavior. If S = LB the assumption (iii) implies that the 
probability measure µ is unique. Savage [1954] regards it as 
desirable on normative grounds to make coherent choices. Since, at 
least in principle, it is possible for anyone to evaluate 
introspectively choices one would make over lotteries, and thereby 
acquire a prior, it is a reasonable normative assertion that everyone 
should act as if he had a prior. 
Since the Emersonian objection to this argument that 
"Coherency is the hobgoblin of little minds" is regarded as "unfair" 
or "unscientific, " I will give a frequentist procedure for decision-
making which is coherent but not Bayesian. 
The frequentist position can be described as follows. Some 
subsets of Q have been observed to occur (or can be deduced to occur) 
with stable relative frequencies over a sequence of trials. Let B0 
be the a-algebra of such events, and for B E B0 let µ0(B) be the 
frequency of occurence of B. (The interpretation of µ0 and B0 is
unimportant for what follows.) The frequentist asserts that all 
decision must be based on the measure µ0• If f, g E LB are 
B0-measurable than the frequentist will choose f over g if 
ffdµ0 > f gdµ0. Quite often B0 is the trivial CT-field so that only 
constant function are measurable. The response to the Bayesian 
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question "How does a frequentist chose among non-measurable lotteries" 
is that he would rather not do so. However, if forced to choose he 
proceeds as follows. If f � g with strict inequality for at least 
one w E �. then f is chosen over g. Otherwise, construct the smallest 
CT-field B1 such that B0 ::::_ B1 and both f and g are measurable. Let 
M0, M1 be the subspaces of B0 and B1-measurable functions of L. 
There exists a positive linear functional separating f and g which 
is an extension of µ0 to M1• Normalize it to a probability measure 
and call it µ1. Proceed to make subsequent choices by the same 
procedure. The Bayesian argument seems to be that one can go through 
such a procedure introspectively and come up with a unique �rior 
at the end, which can then be used for purpose of inference. The 
frequentist response is contained in the following. 
Theorem 2: ' Let B, µ' be an extension of B0, µ0, so that B0 ::::_ B' and µ' 
is a finitely additive positive measure which coincides with µ0 on B0• 
There exists a well-ordered set T with minimal element 0, and for 
each t E T, a pair of lotteries (ft,gt), a CT-field At with measure 
\!t satisfying 
(i) A0 = B0 vo = µo 
(ii) Fix s; then for all t < s, ft and gt are measurable with 
respect to B , and fgtdv > ff
t
dv , s s - s 
(iii) 
and B and v are extensions of B and v for all t. s s t t 
t t t t For all t E T, f ,g are B• measurable and Jg dµ' .:"._ff dµ' . 
Discussion: The theorem states that by following the rule "pick the 
second element in a lottery when the two are not comparable" and 
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picking the. right sequence of lotteries, one can arrive at any extension 
of the measure µ0• Thus the process of introspection does not lead 
to a determinate subjective probability; one might arrive at any 
probability measure depending on the sequence in which the choices are 
considered. (It might be of some interest to characterize the possible 
extensions of a measure µ0 for a statistician following some fixed 
rule such as minimax, etc., for choosing among admissiable rules. ) 
It is clear that the probability arrived at in this manner is not a 
reflection of the beliefs of the frequentist, nor does it contain 
information about the world, and hence cannot have any value in making 
inferences. When looked at in this light, the Bayesian Frequentist 
dispute revolves around how one should choose B0 and µ0• The Bayesian 
typically insist the B0 should contain a large collection of events 
and the frequestists hold the B0 is typically a small set. The 
resolution of this dispute is beyond the scope of theory. 
Proof of Theorem 2: This is straight forward. Let W : T � B' ""- B0 be a 
well-ordering of sets belonging to B' but not B0. Define g
t 
= XW(t) (w) 
t if f µ'(dw)? f µ'(dw) and g = ��( )C otherwise (where 
W(t) W(t)c t 
XA is the characteristic function of A). Define f
t = 1-gt. Fix 
s € T and assume At and yt have been defined for all t < s to satisfy 
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(i), (ii) and (iii). Let A' = U A . s t<s t Let A be the smallest measure s 
which makes ft and gt measurable, and includes A', and define y to be 
s s 
the restriction of µ' to As. It is easy to verify that all the 
induction hypotheses are satisfied. This completes the proof. 
Conclusions 
• 
We have seen that the argument that one can arrive at a prior 
distribution by introspective choice over lotteries is true but 
misleading since the prior chosen through such a process will in 
general depend on the order in which these choices are made. 
Another way of phrasing the argument is as follows. If one starts 
with a completely defined coherent prior over all subsets of the 
parameter space, then one can of course make coherent choices over 
lotteries. In this case there is no objection to the subjectivist 
position. However, if one has only vaguely defined prior beliefs, 
these cannot be extended to a completely specified prior in a unique 
way simply by the requirement of coherence. 
It should be noted that a similar argument can be given to 
show that economic agents can make consistent choices without having 
completely defined utility functions. 
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